The following notes are inspired by Jesse Jaffe’s proposal for Fractally on EOS.
Jesse’s proposal is linked below.
Table of Contents:
- Feedback about Jesse’s newest proposal for ƒractally on EOS
- Questions and Concerns
- Credible Neutrality and Kolmogorov Complexity
- Older questions & notes about Jesse’s Proposal
- Ideas for bootstrapping ƒractally with Pomelo
- Feedback for Tadas’ Proposal & Inspirations for Pomelo + ƒractally
- Ideas for combining Pomelo bootstrapping Proposal with Jesse’s Proposal
- Ideas for empowering Eden communities with voting weight to fund fractals
Feedback about Jesse’s newest proposal for ƒractally on EOS
Very interesting & helpful proposal! Thank you so much for all the thought, care, and excellent work here! 🙌🏽 🙏🏽
I haven’t had the chance to read and respond to everything in thorough detail yet and am looking forward to refining & discussing this more in the future. By the way, the formatting on this page is also a bit strange... sorry about that, I will improve it in the future to make it easier to read. Please feel free to share any questions or comments. Hope it helps!
Here are some notes so far:
Some questions and concerns:
A bit jarring to see 5 month here without prior explanation...
I’m confused here. I think process above would mean that: councils do not reward liquidity providers with their Respect token and the fractal does not receive EOS subsidies, but rather councils add their Respect token into a liquidity pool with a non-prime fractal and liquidity providers receive EOS subsidies. It seems opposite here…?
- Will 5 month be too much lag time?
- We need to be agile to make decisions fast enough. Ie Eden 6 month was a long time to make changes. Solana grew from 0 to top 10 in like a year.
- What if fractals experience rapid growth?
- How do allocation rates reset at the end of 5 months?
- Why 21k participants? Seems rather arbitrary… what if 1k participants are doing excellent work and creating enormous value? Or if 50k are showing up but not doing much?
- Several questions regarding the numbers on page 5 and 6:
- Why does the amount of EOS vary with the amount of weekly meeting participants?
- It starts at 100 then doubles, then goes down gradually. Why?
- Is the amount of EOS per weekly meeting participant is allocated to holders of respect for each community?
- So if there’s a fractal with 2000 active participants, then every week there would be 5% of 400k EOS (or 20k EOS) allocated to Respect owners of that fractal. So if someone was ranked 6 every week and owned an outsized portion of the fractal’s Respect, then they would get a much larger portion of the EOS subsidies...
- For example, if someone owns 1% of all Respect then they would receive 1% of 20k EOS every week, whereas if someone gets ranked 1 every week and owns 0.001% of Respect, then they would receive 0.001% of the 20k EOS per week. Correct?
- Would it make more sense to programmatically disburse EOS to the fractal participants based on their ranking in the ƒractal meetings (and social media posts), rather than their Respect owned?
- The difference here is that disbursing EOS based on Respect owned directly rewards people who purchased Respect, whereas disbursing EOS based on ranking would only directly reward people who participate in weekly meetings (and social media)
- Is EOS distributed via both mutual respect formed by councils AND the amount of participants in each fractal?
- I think this is explained somewhere in the proposal but am not sure and need to read it again…
- What is the allocation/reward for these two distribution destinations?
- On the last few pages, is there too much planning and arbitrary numbers?
- I’m super into this subject and it was kind of difficult to read because it was so dense with new ideas, qualifications, and thought structures. I greatly appreciate the thoughtfulness and am looking forward to learning more, but I wonder if we might lose the attention of people (ie the ENF) if it’s too complex.
- In addition to the ENF, we should also make it as simple as possible for all participants so that each participant can easily explain their overall communal goal without getting swamped in the details (kind of like how Terra Luna has simple guiding principle of increasing usage for terra stablecoin, which makes it easier for community to rally around than EOS which has had a much more complex narrative).
- We should aim to make the proposal and framework for growth as simple as possible.
- Please see notes in the file below about credible neutrality, Gall’s Law, and Kolmogorov complexity.
- I think these notes are relevant and very helful for our proposal here
Credible Neutrality and Kolmogorov Complexity
Simplicity is needed for credible neutrality. I’m concerned that some parts of Jesse’s proposal may have some elements of ‘Central planning as overfitting‘ as Vitalik writes about in the Credible Neutrality article ….
Related questions & notes about Jesse’s Proposal (from ƒractally Brainstorming Session 3)
I wrote these questions and notes during ƒractally Brainstorming Session 3 and I think they are still relevant. I don’t have great answers to these questions yet….
There is also some great conversation during this meeting and meeting 4 that would be helpful to listen to again and save in these notes…
Important to remember: Dan Larimer said measure success in amount of members & market value of tokens
- Zack asked where does the market price come from?
- Find his post in fractally telegram - he wrote it well
- Should the ratio be based upon total amount of Respect tokens or the market value of Respect tokens?
- I asked this- listen again to Jesse’s response & save timestamp here
- What if English is participating substantially more than other languages?
- I asked this - listen again to Jesse’s response & save timestamp here
- What if there English grows faster and there 10,000 English participants and only 100 Chinese or Korean or Spanish?
- What if there are multiple branch of ƒractals in English?
- How to determine when other languages ƒractals start and be eligible to earn rewards?
- I think Jesse answered this, but am not sure….
- So in Jesse’s proposal the participants in fractals are earning EOS in addition to Respect of local fractals? Or…
- Since EOS disbursement is based on number of participants…
- is this incentivizing community growth too much without also incentivizing price and value created?
- For example, what if someone in Chinese fractal invites a bunch of people who are attending but not contributing?
Dan Larimer said measure success in amount of members & market value of tokens….
- Would it make sense to start with the three Edens?
- Or would it make more sense to start with ƒractals independently of Edens?
- See bottom section for more about this
Ideas for bootstrapping ƒractally with Pomelo
Proposal for bootstrapping Fractally with pomelo from notes from ƒractally on EOS meeting 4:
first mention of pomelo for Fractally - https://youtu.be/zPygTuYlKp4?t=2813
explaining the hybrid model with pomelo to Jesse- https://youtu.be/zPygTuYlKp4?t=4125
Meeting 4: Jesse requested that I write this and I think it’s a great idea
In meeting 6 on April 18 (towards the end), Jesse said that Denis from EOS Nation didn’t like the Pomelo idea, but it sounds like Jesse didn’t explain it very well and he encouraged me to write it
I still need to write the idea for bootstrapping fractally on EOS. It is quite simple. I think i explain it well in the video timestamps above and wrote a very brief outline below:
Feedback for Tadas’ Proposal and earliest notes about Pomelo bootstrapping fractally mechanism, Meeting 4
How does the community determine how to value projects?
Tadas mentioned… ‘Pegging ƒractal objective value with Pomelo’
Bootstrapping ƒractal with objective measures already built in with Pomelo
Perhaps proposing an amplifier in matching pool for ƒractals on Pomelo
Then funding could be allocated according to fractals according to will of the people as represented in quadratic funding algorithm
Benefits of Pomelo Bootstrapping Mechanism include:
- Provides incentives for each group to grow, introduce new people to both pomelo and fractally, and allocate support from ENF based upon how many people are supporting on Pomelo
- Provides simple and credibly neutral algorithm that is easy for everyone to understand
- It is simple, proven successful, and already built & operated by the Pomelo team
Regarding Jesse’s thought about nationalism:
- [[Coopetition, competition etymology , cooperation]]
- I responded to this more towards the end of meeting 4. Douglas did too.
What about combining the pomelo mechanism with Jesse’s proposal…?
Ideas for combining Pomelo bootstrapping Proposal with Jesse’s Proposal
Some initial notes/ideas:
Ask ENF for 1 million EOS
33% distributed via pomelo matching algorithm
33% distributed via amount of participants in Jesse’s proposal
33% distributed via mutual respect in Jesse’s Proposal
Just throwing numbers out there.
Maybe it’s best to make a proposal that only uses Pomelo matching algorithm as I don’t entirely understand Jesse’s proposal yet and I think this could work on its own as well…?
More questions regarding Jesse’s proposal, this Pomelo proposal, and more:
- How is mutual respect formed in the beginning?
- Just with 33% for the English, Chinese, and Korean Eden?
- Or via market dynamics?
- How do we prevent the amount of participants from being gamed?
- Or pomelo being gamed?
- Maybe we need rules?
- Or this solved by just social culture, trust, and reputation?
- How do we verify the amount of participants in fractals?
- By hive post?
- How do we verify that people really attended?
Ideas for empowering Eden communities with voting weight to fund fractals
Eden delegates from all three Edens get voting weight to determine which fractals to fund in their language.
Same ratio as currently for funding where chief delegates get more, but for allocation of funding to fractals.
Maybe too early for that? Idk. Seems helpful to leverage the trust built into Eden and empower delegates with some voting power
Decentralized Voting power for which fractals to fund in each language might be very helpful.
Eventually the fractal can have the voting power, but there is no fractal yet other than the first fractal. Eden has legitimate elections and leaders already in all three languages. So we can start by providing voting power to current Eden delegates to allocate funding to fractals.
The Eden delegates could choose to focus all of the funding to one fractal (Ie the Korean fractal or the Chinese Eden), or members can ask for funding for their own nee fractals that branch off
Maybe combine this proposal with a token proposal that it seems like dan Larimer is creating with exponential decay….